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Abstract
We construct efficient authentication protocols and message authentication codes (MACs) whose
security can be reduced to the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem.
Despite a large body of work—starting with the HB protocol of Hopper and Blum in 2001—
until now it was not even known how to construct an efficient authentication protocol from LPN
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1 Introduction
Authentication is among the most basic and important cryptographic tasks. In the present paper
we construct efficient (secret-key) authentication schemes from the assumption that the learning
parity with noise (LPN) problem is hard. Informally, this problems asks to distinguish noisy inner
products from random. We construct the first efficient message authentication codes (MACs) from
LPN, but also simpler and more efficient two-round authentication protocols that achieve a notion
called active security. Prior to our work, the only known way to construct an LPN-based MAC
was via a relatively inefficient generic transformation [23] (that works with any pseudorandom
generator), and all interactive LPN-based protocols with security properties similar to our new
protocol required at least three rounds and had a loose security reduction. Our constructions and
techniques diverge significantly from prior work in the area and will hopefully be of independent
interest.
The pursuit of LPN-based authentication is motivated by two disjoint concerns, one theoretical
and one practical. On the theoretical side, the LPN problem provides an attractive basis for provable
security [3, 5, 6, 32, 27, 41]. It is closely related to the well-studied problem of decoding random
linear codes, and unlike most number-theoretic problems used in cryptography, the LPN problem
does not succumb to known quantum algorithms. On the practical side, LPN-based authentication
schemes are strikingly efficient, requiring relatively few bit-level operations. Indeed, in their original
proposal, Hopper and Blum [27] suggested that humans could perform the computation in their
provably-secure scheme, even with realistic parameters.
Each of our theoretical and practical motivations, on its own, would be sufficiently interesting for
investigation, but together the combination is particularly compelling. LPN-based authentication
is able to provide a theoretical improvement in terms of provable security in addition to providing
better efficiency than approaches based on more classical symmetric techniques that are not related
to hard problems. Usually we trade one benefit for the other, but here we hope to get the best of
both worlds.
Before describing our contributions in more detail, we start by recalling authentication protocols,
the LPN problem, and some of the prior work on which we build.
Authentication protocols. An authentication protocol is a (shared-key) protocol where a prover
P authenticates itself to a verifier V. We recall some of the common definitions for security against
impersonation attacks. A passive attack proceeds in two phases, where in the first phase the ad-
versary eavesdrops on several interactions between P and V, and then attempts to cause V to
accept in the second phase (where P is no longer available). In an active attack, the adversary is
additionally allowed to interact with P in the first phase. The strongest and most realistic attack
model is a man-in-the-middle attack (MIM), where the adversary can arbitrarily interact with P
and V (with polynomially many concurrent executions allowed), and wins if it can make V accept
in any execution where at least one message was changed.
The LPN problem. For τ < 1/2 and a vector x ∈ Z`2, define the distribution Λτ,`(x) on Z`2×Z2
by (r, rTx + e), where r ∈ Z`2 is uniformly random and e ∈ Z2 is selected according to Berτ ,
the Bernoulli distribution over Z2 with parameter τ (i.e., Pr[e = 1] = τ). The LPNτ,` problem
is to distinguish an oracle returning samples from Λτ,`(x), where x ∈ Z`2 is random and fixed,
from an oracle returning uniform samples. It was shown by Blum et al. [5] that this is equivalent
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Pτ,n(s ∈ Z`2) Vτ ′,n(s ∈ Z`2)
R←− R $← Z`×n2
e
$← Bernτ
z := RT · s + e
z−→ verify: wt(z + RT · s) < τ ′ · n
Figure 1: The HB protocol, secure against passive attacks.
to the search version of LPN, where one needs to find x given oracle access to Λτ,`(x) (cf. [31,
Thm.2] for precise bounds). We note that the search variant of LPN is efficiently solvable when
there is no noise (i.e. when τ = 0) using Gaussian elimination, for this we just need ` samples
with linearly independent r’s. The best algorithms take time 2`/ log ` when τ > 0 is treated as a
constant [6, 34, 24, 46, 9, 8, 7].
Authentication protocols from LPN. Starting with the work of Hopper and Blum [27], several
authentication protocols based on the LPN problem have been proposed. Their original elegant
protocol is simple enough for us to recall right away. The shared secret key is a binary vector
s ∈ Z`2. The interaction consists of two messages. First V sends a random challenge r ∈ Z`2, and
then P answers with the bit z = rTs + e, where e ∈ Z2 is sampled according to Berτ . Finally, the
verifier accepts if z = rTs.
This basic protocol has a large completeness error τ (as V will reject if e = 1) and soundness
error 1/2 (as a random r, z satisfies rTs = z with probability 1/2). This can be reduced via
sequential or parallel composition. The parallel variant, denoted HB, is illustrated in Figure 1 (we
represent several r with a matrix R and the noise bits are now arranged in a vector e). The verifier
accepts if at least a τ ′ fraction (where τ < τ ′ < 1/2) of the n basic authentication steps are correct.
The 2-round HB protocol is provably secure against passive attacks, but efficient active attacks
are known against it. This is unsatisfying because in several scenarios an adversary will be able to
mount an active attack. Subsequently, Juels and Weis [28] proposed an efficient 3 round variant
of HB, called HB+, and proved it secure against active attacks. Again the error can be reduced
by sequential repetition, and as shown by Katz, Shin and Smith via a non-trivial analysis, parallel
repetition works as well [30, 31]. The protocol (in its parallel repetition variant) is illustrated in
Figure 2.
Gilbert et al. [20] showed that HB+ can be broken by a MIM attack. Several variants HB++ [11],
HB∗ [16], HB-MP [37] were proposed to prevent the particular attack from [20], but all of them
were later shown to be insecure [21]. In [22], a variant HB# was presented which provably resists
the particular attack from [20], but was shown susceptible to a more general MIM attack [38].
However, no improvements in terms of round complexity, security or tightness of the reduction over
HB+ were achieved: 3 round protocols achieving active security
√
ε (assuming LPN is ε-hard) are
the state of the art.
1.1 Our Contribution
We provide new constructions of authentication protocols and even MACs from LPN. Our first
contribution is a two-round authentication protocol secure against active adversaries (this is men-
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R2←− R2 $← Z`×n2
e
$← Bernτ
z := RT1 · s1 + RT2 · s2 + e
z−→ verify:
wt(z + RT1 · s1 + RT2 · s2) ≤ τ ′ · n
Figure 2: The HB+ protocol, secure against active attacks.
tioned as an open problem in [28]) which moreover has a tight security reduction (an open problem
mentioned in [31]). As a second contribution, we build two efficient MACs, and thus also get
two-round authentication protocols secure against MIM attacks, from the LPN assumption. Unlike
some previous proposals, our constructions are not ad-hoc, and we give a reduction to the LPN
problem. Our authentication protocol is roughly as efficient as the HB+ protocol but has twice the
key length. Our MACs perform roughly the same computation as the authentication protocol plus
one evaluation of a pairwise independent permutation of an ≈ 2` bit domain, where ` is the length
of an LPN secret.
2-round authentication with active security. Our first contribution is a two-round authen-
tication protocol which we prove secure against active attacks assuming the hardness of the LPN
problem. Our protocol diverges considerably from all previous HB-type protocols [27, 28, 31, 22],
and runs counter to the intuition that the only way to efficiently embed the LPN problem into a
two-round protocol is via an HB-type construction.
We now sketch our protocol. In HB and its variants, the prover must compute LPN samples of
the form RT · s + e, where R is the challenge chosen by the verifier in the first message. We take a
different approach. Instead of sending R, we now let the verifier choose a random subset of the bits
of s to act as the “session-key” for this interaction. It represents this subset by sending a binary
vector v ∈ Z`2 that acts as a “bit selector” of the secret s, and we write s↓v for the sub-vector
of s which is obtained by deleting all bits from s where v is 0. (E.g. if s = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)T,v =
(0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)T then s↓v = (1, 1, 0)T.) The prover then picks R by itself and computes noisy inner
products of the form RT · s↓v + e. Curiously, allowing the verifier to choose which bits of s to use
in each session is sufficient to prevent active attacks. We only need to add a few sanity-checks that
no pathological v or R were sent by an active adversary.
Our proof relies on the recently introduced subspace LPN problem [40]. In contrast to the
active-attack security proof of HB+ [31], our proof does not use any rewinding techniques. Avoiding
rewinding has at least two advantages. First, the security reduction becomes tight. Second, the
proofs also work in a quantum setting: our protocol is secure against quantum adversaries assuming
LPN is secure against such adversaries. As first observed by van de Graaf [43], classical proofs using
rewinding in general do not translate to the quantum setting (cf. [45] for a more recent discussion).
Let us emphasise that this only means that there is no security proof for HB+ in the quantum
setting, but we do not know if a quantum attack actually exists.
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MAC & man-in-the-middle security. In Section 4, we give two constructions of message
authentication codes (MACs) that are secure (formally, unforgeable under chosen message attacks)
assuming that the LPN problem is hard. It is well known that a MAC implies a two-round MIM-
secure authentication protocol: the verifier chooses a random message as challenge, and the prover
returns the MAC on the message.
As a first attempt, let us try to view our authentication protocol as a MAC. That is, a MAC
tag is of the form φ = (R, z = RT · fs(m) + e), where the secret key derivation function fs(m) ∈ Z`2
first uniquely encodes the message m into v ∈ Z2`2 of weight ` and then returns s↓v by selecting `
bits from secret s, according to v. However, this MAC is not secure: given a MAC tag φ = (R, z)
an adversary can ask verification queries where it sets individual rows of R to zero until verification
fails: if the last row set to zero was the ith, then the ith bit of fs(m) must be 1.
1 Our solution
is to randomize the mapping f , i.e. use fs(m,b) for some randomness b and compute the tag as
φ = pi(R,RT · fs(m,b) + e,b), where pi is a pairwise independent permutation (contained in the
secret key). We can prove that if LPN is hard then this construction yields a secure MAC. (The
key argument is that, with high probability, all non-trivial verification queries are inconsistent and
hence lead to reject.) However, the security reduction to the LPN problem is quite loose, concretely,
assuming the LPN problem is  hard and the adversary makes Q queries we get security of roughly
Q
√
. Moreover there’s a non-uniformity issue as we need to know , or at least have a good guess
on it, to achieve this bound (concretely, the optimal choice of parameter µ used in the protocol
depends on , cf. Corollary 4.3).
We also give another construction with a much tighter reduction and completely uniform reduc-
tion achieving security roughly Q. For this, we instantiate the above MAC with a different secret
key derivation function fs(m,b) = s0 +S ·v (where v = h(m,b) and h(·) is a pairwise independent
hash). The drawback of our second construction is the larger key size, as the secret key contains a
matrix S ∈ Z`×µ2 . The security reduction uses a technique from [13, 4] that we needed to adapt to
the case of LPN.2
1.2 Efficiency
Figure 3 gives a rough comparison of our new authentication protocols with the HB,HB+ protocols
and, as a reference, also the protocol one gets by using the PRF constructed via the classical tree-
based GGM construction [23] when the underlying PRG is instantiated with LPN. λ denotes a
statistical security parameter, say λ = 80. Q denotes the total number of queries made during the
attack. The second row in the table specifies the security notion that is (provably) achieved under
the LPNτ,` or “subset LPN” SLPN
∗
τ,L,`′ assumption (all notions will be defined in §2.4). Typical
parameters suggested for HB type protocols [34] are ` = 768, τ = 0.05, at this level they estimate
ε ≈ 2−80 security for LPNτ,`, which is sufficient for schemes with a tight security reduction like for
passive security of HB or active security of our AUTH protocol (cf. the last column in Figure 3).
The SLPN∗τ,L,`′ assumption reduces to LPNτ,`′−g with an additive loss of Q/2g, so we should set
`′ ≈ `+ 80, say `′ = 850.
The reduction for all these protocols (except GGM) loses an additional additive Q · 2−Θ(n)
1While we believe the above scheme would be secure in case verification queries are not allowed, this is of limited
interest in practice. Furthermore, the main technical difficulty in building an efficient MAC from LPN seems to be
ensuring the secret s does not leak from verification queries.
2 An earlier version of this paper adapted a technique originally used by Waters [44] in the context of IBE schemes
that has been applied to lattice based signature [10] and encryption schemes [1].
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Construction Achieved security Rounds Complexity Key size Security
notion Communication Computation
HB [27] passive 2 ` · n/c Θ(` · n) ` · c ε (tight)
HB+ [28] active 3 ` · n · 2/ c Θ(` · n) ` · 2 · c √ε
AUTH § 3 active 2 `′ · n · (2 + γ)/c Θ(`′ · n) `′ · 2(2 + γ) · c ε (tight)
MAC1 § 4.1 MIM from MAC 2 `′ · n · (2 + γ)/c Θ(`′ · n) + PIP `′ · 6(2 + γ) · c
√
ε ·Q (?)
MAC2 § 4.2 MIM from MAC 2 ` · n/c Θ(` · n) + PIP ` · λ · c ε ·Q
GGM [23] MIM from PRF 2 3 · λ Θ(`2 · λ) Θ(`) ε ·Q · λ
Figure 3: A comparison of our new authentication protocols with the HB, HB+ protocols and the
classical GGM construction. The trade-off parameter c (1 ≤ c ≤ n) and the term PIP are explained
in the “Communication vs. key size” paragraph below. The value ε refers to the hardness of the
LPNτ,` or SLPN
∗
τ,L,`′ problem. In the last (security) column we ignore additive terms of the form
Q · 2−Θ(n). (?) is a non-uniform reduction, see discussion in §4.
term, where n is the number of repetitions required to amplify the security of a basic protocol
which only achieves constant soundness and security. The hidden constant in Θ(·) depends on τ













)2n (cf. §3.2), to make this term < 2−80 it suffices to set n = 360
and γ = 0.75. Summing up, with `′ = 850, τ = 0.05, n = 360, γ = 0.75 we provably get around 80
bits security for AUTH assuming LPN provides 80 bits security for ` = 786, τ = 0.05.
Computation complexity counts the number of binary operations over F2. Communication
complexity counts the total length of all exchanged messages.3 The last row in the table states
the tightness of the security reduction, i.e. what exact security is achieved (ignoring constants and
higher order terms) assuming the LPNτ,` problem is ε-hard.
The prover and verifier in the HB,HB+ and our new protocols have to perform Θ(` · n) basic
binary operations, assuming the LPNτ,` problem (i.e., LPN with secrets of length `) is hard. This
seems optimal, as Θ(`) operations are necessary to compute the inner product which generates a
single pseudorandom bit. We will thus consider an authentication protocol or MAC efficient, if it
requires O(` ·n) binary operations. Let us mention that one gets a length-doubling PRG under the
LPNτ,` assumption with Θ(`
2) binary operations [17]. Via the classical GGM construction [23], we
obtain a PRF and hence a MAC. This PRF, however, requires Θ(`2 · λ) operations per invocation
(where λ is the size of the domain of the PRF) which is not very practical.
Communication vs. key size. For all constructions except GGM, there is a natural trade-off
between communication and key size, where for any constant c (1 ≤ c ≤ n), we can decrease
communication by a factor of c and increase key size by the factor c (cf. Appendix A for how
exactly this can be done). For the first three protocols in the table, the choice of c does not affect
the computational efficiency, but it does so for the MAC based construction: to compute or verify
3For MAC and PRF based constructions, we consider the communication one incurs by constructing a MIM
secure 2-round protocol from the MAC (or PRF) by having the prover compute the MAC (PRF output) on a random
ρ-bit challenge message. If the adversary can observe Q executions and make q attempts to convince a verifier, the
probability of a successful break is at most Q · q/2ρ (plus the security of the MAC/PRF). As we define security for
q = 1, setting ρ := λ for our statistical security parameter λ = 80 is sufficient. For the PRF based construction an
output length of λ is sufficient.
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a tag one has to evaluate a pairwise independent permutation (PIP) on the entire tag of length
l := Θ(` · n/c).
There are two standard ways how to construct a PIP pi over F2l , which we briefly review below
together with their corresponding computational complexity:
• Define pi(x) := a ·x+b ∈ F2l for random a, b ∈ F2l . Thus the computational cost of evaluating
the PIP is one multiplication of two m bits values: Asymptotically, such a multiplication takes
only O(l log l log log l) time [42, 18], but for small l (like in our scheme) this will not be faster
than using schoolbook multiplication, which takes Θ(l2) time.
• Define pi(x) := A · x + b ∈ {0, 1}l, where we now interpret the input as an l-bit vector, and
where A is a Toeplitz matrix4 of dimension l and b is a random l-bit vector. The product of
any Toeplitz matrix with any vector takes time O(l log l) [29, 2], but note that the description
of pi now requires to store roughly 3l bits (whereas the previous solution just requires 2l bits).
The PIP term in the table accounts for the above complexity. For parameters ` = 850, n =
360, γ = 0.75 as above and trade-off c = n (which minimizes the tag-length l) we get l ≈ 2400
(2(1+γ)` plus a statistical security parameter) for MAC1 and l ≈ 930 for MAC2 (` plus a statistical
security parameter). Hence, depending on the parameters, the evaluation of the PIP may be the
computational bottleneck of our MACs.
1.3 Subsequent Work
An abridged version of this paper appeared as [33]. Our results inspired several follow-up works on
the problem of efficient authentication from hard learning problems. In [15], Dodis et al. started
a systematic study of randomized MACs and showed how to replace the PIP from our MAC
constructions with a pairwise independent hash function (leading to more efficient schemes). Heyse
et al. [25] considered a variant of our actively secure authentication protocol based on the Ring-LPN
problem (introduced in [36]) which simultaneously achieves a very short key and low communication
complexity. The hardware efficiency and side-channel security of Lapin was analysed in [19].
Lyubashevsky and Masny [35] built three-round authentication protocols from LPN that are
man-in-the-middle secure for sequential sessions. In [12], Cash, Kiltz and Tessaro show how to




For a positive integer k, [k] denotes the set {1, . . . , k}; [0] is the empty set. For a, b ∈ R, ]a, b[=
{x ∈ R ; a < x < b}. We denote the set of integers modulo an integer q ≥ 1 by Zq. We will use
normal, bold and capital bold letters like x, x, X to denote single elements, (column) vectors and
matrices over Zq, respectively. X[i] denotes the i-th column vector of matrix X. x[i] denotes the
i-th element of vector x.
For a vector x ∈ Zmq , |x| = m denotes the length of x; wt(x) denotes the Hamming weight of
the vector x, i.e. the number of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , |x|} where x[i] 6= 0. For v ∈ Zm2 we denote
by v its inverse, i.e. v[i] = 1 − v[i] for all i. For two vectors v ∈ Z`2 and x ∈ Z`q, we denote by
4Such a matrix is constructed by picking the entries of the first row and column uniformly at random from {0, 1},
and then copying each value all along its corresponding diagonal.
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x↓v ∈ Zwt(v)q the vector (of length wt(v)) which is derived from x by deleting all the bits x[i] where
v[i] = 0. If X ∈ Z`×m2 is a matrix, then X↓v denotes the sub-matrix obtained by deleting the ith
row if v[i] = 0. We also extend Boolean operators to vectors, i.e., for two vectors x,y ∈ Zm2 we
define x ∧ v = z ∈ Zm2 with z[i] = x[i] ∧ y[i] and x ∨ v = z ∈ Zm2 where z[i] = x[i] ∨ y[i].
A function in λ is negligible, written negl(λ), if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any poly-
nomial in λ. An algorithm A is probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) if A uses some randomness
as part of its logic (i.e., A is probabilistic) and for any input x ∈ {0, 1}∗ the computation of A(x)
terminates in at most poly(|x|) steps.
2.2 Authentication Protocols
An authentication protocol is an interactive protocol executed between a prover P and a verifier
V, both PPT algorithms. Both hold a secret x (generated using a key-generation algorithm K
executed on the security parameter λ in unary) that has been shared in an initial phase. After
the execution of the authentication protocol, V outputs either accept or reject. We say that the
protocol has completeness error α if for all secret keys x generated by K(1λ), the honestly executed
protocol returns reject with probability at most α.
Passive attacks. An authentication protocol is secure against passive attacks if there exists no
PPT adversary A who can win the following game with non-negligible probability: In a first phase,
we sample a key x ← K(1λ), and then A gets to see any number of transcripts from the protocol
execution between P(x) and V(x) (including V’s final decision accept or reject). In a second phase
A interacts with V(x), and wins if the verifier outputs accept. Here we only give the adversary one
shot to convince the verifier.5
Active attacks. A stronger notion for authentication protocols is security against active attacks.
Here the second phase is the same as in a passive attack, but in the first phase, the adversary A is
additionally given access to P(x). For two-round protocols there is no difference between concurrent
and sequential execution of the sessions with the prover.
We say an authentication protocol is (t, Q, ε)-secure against active adversaries if every adversary
A, running in time at most t and making Q queries to the honest prover, has probability at most
ε to win the above game.
Man-in-the-middle attacks. The strongest standard security notion for authentication proto-
cols is security against man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacks. Here, the adversary can interact con-
currently in many sessions between the prover and the verifier. The adversary gets to learn the
verifier accept/reject decisions, and wins whenever it manages to let the verifier accept in a session
where it changed at least one of the messages sent by the prover or the verifier. One can construct
two-round authentication schemes which are secure against MIM attacks from basic cryptographic
primitives like MACs, which we define next.
5By using a hybrid argument one can show that this implies security even if the adversary can interact in k ≥ 1
independent instances concurrently (and wins if the verifier accepts in at least one instance). The use of the hybrid







( ∃(m,φ) ∈ Qvrfy s.t. m 6∈ Qtag
∧V(K,m, φ) = accept
)
Oracle Tag(m)




Qvrfy := Qvrfy ∪ {(m,φ)}
Return V(K,m, φ)
Figure 4: Experiment Expuf−cmaMAC (A, λ) defining uf-cma security of MAC.
2.3 Message Authentication Codes
A message authentication code MAC = {K, T ,V} is a triple of algorithms with associated key space
K, message space M, and tag space T .
• Key Generation. The probabilistic key-generation algorithm K takes as input a security pa-
rameter λ ∈ N (in unary) and outputs a secret key K ∈ K.
• Tagging. The probabilistic authentication algorithm T takes as input a secret key K ∈ K and
a message m ∈M and outputs an authentication tag φ ∈ T .
• Verification. The deterministic verification algorithm V takes as input a secret key K ∈ K, a
message m ∈M and a tag φ ∈ T and outputs {accept, reject}.
If the T algorithm is deterministic one does not have to explicitly define V, since it is already
defined by the T algorithm as V(K,m, φ) = accept iff T (K,m) = φ.
Completeness. We say that MAC has completeness error α = α(λ) if for all m ∈M and λ ∈ N
Pr[V(K,m, φ) = reject : K ← K(1λ);φ← T (K,m)] ≤ α.
Security. The standard security notion for a MAC is unforgeability under a chosen message
attack (uf-cma). Formally this is the probability that the experiment Expuf−cmaMAC (A, λ) of Figure 4
outputs 1. The experiment features an adversary A that issues tag queries on messages m, and
verification queries on pairs (m,φ); the adversary is successful if she ever asks a verification query
(m,φ) that is accepted, for some message m not previously asked to the tag oracle (i.e., A has found
a valid forgery). We say that MAC is (t, Q, ε)-secure against uf-cma adversaries if for any A running
in time t, and asking a total number of Q queries to her oracles, we have Pr[Expuf−cmaMAC (A, λ) =
1] ≤ ε.
2.4 Hard Learning Problems
Let Berτ be the Bernoulli distribution over Z2 with parameter (bias) τ ∈ ]0, 1/2[ (i.e., Pr[x = 1] = τ
if x ← Berτ ). For ` ≥ 1, Ber`τ denotes the distribution over Z`2 where each vector consists of `
independent samples drawn from Berτ . Given a secret x ∈ Z`2 and τ ∈]0, 12 [ , we write Λτ,`(x) for
the distribution over Z`2×Z2 whose samples are obtained by sampling vectors r $← Z`2 and e $← Berτ
outputting (r, rT · x + e).
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2.4.1 Learning Parity with Noise
The LPN assumption, formally defined below, states that it is hard to distinguish Λτ,`(x) (with a
random secret x ∈ Z`2) from the uniform distribution on `+ 1 bits denoted U`+1.
Definition 2.1 (Learning Parity with Noise). The (decisional) LPNτ,` problem is (t, Q, ε)-hard if
for every distinguisher D running in time t and making Q queries,∣∣∣Pr [DΛτ,`(x) = 1; x $← Z`2]− Pr [DU`+1 = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
It will sometimes be convenient to think of U`+1 as LPN samples with uniform errors, note that
for any x, the distributions Λ1/2,`(x) and U`+1 are the same.
2.4.2 Subspace Learning Parity with Noise
We now define the (seemingly) stronger subspace LPN assumption (SLPN for short) introduced
in [40]. Here the adversary can ask for inner products not only with the secret x, but with any
affine function Ax + b of x where A can be any (adversarially and adaptively chosen) matrix of
sufficiently high rank. For minimal dimension d ≤ `, a secret x ∈ Z`2 and any A ∈ Z`×`2 ,b ∈ Z`2 we
define the distribution
Γτ,`,d(x,A,b) =
{ ⊥ if rank(A) < d
Λτ,`(A · x + b) otherwise
and let Γτ,`,d(x, ·, ·) denote the oracle which on input A,b outputs a sample from Γτ,`,d(x,A,b).
Definition 2.2 (Subspace LPN). Let `, d ∈ Z where d ≤ `. The (decisional) SLPNτ,`,d problem is
(t, Q, ε)-hard if for every distinguisher D running in time t and making Q queries,∣∣∣Pr [DΓτ,`,d(x,·,·) = 1; x $← Z`2]− Pr [DU`+1(·,·) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε,
where U`+1(·, ·) on input A,b outputs a sample of U`+1 if rank(A) ≥ d and ⊥ otherwise.
The following proposition states that the subspace LPN problem mapping to dimension d + g
is almost as hard as the standard LPN problem with secrets of length d, the hardness gap being
exponentially small in g. This proposition is a special case of Theorem 1 from [40]. To be self
contained we include a proof of this proposition, but first we state a much simpler result, which
will be used in the construction of our second MAC, namely that the subspace LPN problem is
exactly as hard as the LPN problem if d = `, i.e., the subspace must span the entire space.
Proposition 2.3. For any ` ∈ Z if the LPNτ,` problem is (t, Q, ε)-hard then the SLPNτ,`,` problem
is (t′, Q, ε)-hard where t′ = t− poly(`,Q)
Proof. Given a Λτ,`(x) sample (r, r
Tx+e), for any A,b where rank(A) = `, we can transform it into
a Γτ,`,`(x,A,b) sample (rˆ, rˆ
T(Ax+b)+e by setting rˆT = rTA−1 and outputting (rˆ, rTx+e+ rˆTb).
We now have
(rˆ, rTx + e+ rˆTb) = (rˆ, rˆTAx + e+ rˆTb) = (rˆ, rˆT(Ax + b) + e)
It just remains to check that e and rˆ have the right distribution. The error e in the subspace
LPN sample is exactly the same value as in the LPN sample and thus also distributed as Berτ .
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rˆT is uniform as required, to see this recall that r is uniform and A has full rank. Using this
transformation, we can use any distinguisher for SLPNτ,`,` from uniform to distinguish LPNτ,` from
uniform with the same advantage.
Proposition 2.4. For any `, d, g ∈ Z (where ` ≥ d+g), if the LPNτ,d problem is (t, Q, ε)-hard then
the SLPNτ,`,d+g problem is (t
′, Q, ε′)-hard where
t′ = t− poly(`,Q) ε′ = ε+Q/2g.
Proof. Let D′ be an adversary with advantage ε′ for the SLPNτ,`,d+g problem, from this D′ we will
construct an D with advantage ε ≥ ε′ − Q/2g for the LPNτ,d problem. W.l.o.g., we assume that
the oracle queries of D′ are of the form A,b with b = 0 since (rˆ, zˆ) 7→ (rˆ, zˆ + rˆTb) reduces queries
with arbitrary b to queries with b = 0.
Our D will transform the samples of the form (r, rTx + e) it gets (where e is either sampled
according to Berτ or uniform) into samples (rˆ, rˆ
TAxˆ + e) for any A ∈ Z`×`2 of rank ≥ d + g. In
particular, LPN samples are mapped to SLPN samples, and random samples are mapped to random
samples. For each of the Q queries made by D′, the transformation will fail with probability at
most 2−g, which is where the Q/2g loss in distinguishing advantage comes from. We now formally
define D.
Initially, DΛδ,d(x) (where δ is either τ or 1/2) samples W $← Z`×d2 ,w $← Z`2 which (implicitly)
defines the secret xˆ = Wx+w for the transformation. Now, DΛδ,d(x) invokes D′, and answers every
query A of D′ as follows.
If rank(A) < d + g return ⊥ to D′. Otherwise, query the oracle Λδ,d(x) to get a sample
(r, rT · x + e). Define the set S ⊆ Z`2 of solutions to the system of linear equations:
S =
{
y : yTAW = rT
}
⊆ Z`2
Note that if AW has rank d then S is non-empty. D samples rˆ $← S and outputs the sample
(rˆ, rTx + rˆTAw + e), (2.1)
Note that D runs in time t′ (as it must invoke D′) plus some poly(`,Q) overhead as claimed. It
remains to show that simulation performed by D is correct. This is shown in the following claims.
Claim 2.5. If V = AW has (full) rank d, then rˆ
$← S is uniformly random (given A,W,w).
Proof of Claim. We show that for any v ∈ Z`2, Pr[rˆ = v | W,A,w] = 2−`. First, as r ∈ Zd2 is
uniform, Pr[vTAW = rT] = 2−d, if this does not hold, then v 6= rˆ. Otherwise, rˆ is sampled at
uniform from an `− d dimensional linear space, and thus Pr[v = rˆ | vAW = rT] = 2d−`. We get
Pr[rˆ = v |W,A,w] = Pr[vTAW = rT] Pr[v = rˆ | vTAW = rT] = 2−d2d−` = 2−`.
Claim 2.6. D perfectly simulates the distribution Γδ,`,d+g(xˆ,A) (where xˆ = Wx + w).
11
Proof of Claim. We can rewrite the samples of Eq. (2.1) as
(rˆ, rTx + rˆTAw + e) = (rˆ, rˆTAWx + rˆTAw + e) (since rˆ ∈ S)
= (rˆ, rˆTA(Wx + w) + e)
= (rˆ, rˆTAxˆ + e)
which is a sample from Γδ,`,d+g(xˆ,A) as required.
Claim 2.7. The probability that the set S is empty is at most 2−g.
Proof of Claim. Recall that the set S can possibly be empty only when V = AW ∈ Z`×d2 has rank
less than d, where A ∈ Z`×`2 has rank ≥ d+ g and W $← Z`×d2 .
Denote with ∆(d, g) the probability that a random matrix in Z(d+g)×d2 has rank less than d.
Since the matrix A has rank at least d+ g, we can assume, without loss of generality, that the first
d + g rows of A are linearly independent. Since the matrix W is random, the upper (d + g) × d
matrix of V = AW is random in Z(d+g)×d2 and thus it has rank less than d with probability at most
∆(d, g). We conclude that V has rank strictly less than d exactly with the same probability. Using
Lemma B.1, we see that this probability is bounded by 2−g.
Applying the union bound, we can upper bound the probability that for any of the Q queries
the matrix V = AW has rank less than d by Q ·2−g. This error probability is thus an upper bound
on the gap of the success probability ε′ of D′ and the success probability ε we get in breaking LPN
using the transformation.
Finally, we need to consider the fact that the queries A chosen by D′ are chosen adaptively.
To show that adaptivity does not help in picking an A where AW has rank < d we must show
that the view of D′ is independent of W (except for the fact that so far no query was made where
rank(AW) < d). This holds as the secret xˆ = Wx + w used in the simulation is independent of W
as it is blinded with a uniform w. In fact, the only reason we use this blinding is to enforce this
independence.
2.4.3 Subset Learning Parity with Noise
For some of our constructions, we will only need a weaker version of the SLPNτ,`,d problem that we
call subset LPN. As the name suggests, here the adversary does not ask for inner products with
Ax + b for any A (of rank ≥ d), but only with subsets of x (of size ≥ d). It will be convenient to
explicitly define this special case. For x,v ∈ Z`2, let diag(v) ∈ Z`×`2 denote the matrix with v in
the diagonal and zero elsewhere, and let
Γ∗τ,`,d(x,v) := Γτ,`,d(x, diag(v)) =
{ ⊥ if wt(v) < d
Λτ,`(x ∧ v) otherwise.
Definition 2.8 (Subset LPN). Let `, d ∈ Z where d ≤ `. The SLPN∗τ,`,d problem is (t, Q, ε)-hard if
for every distinguisher D running in time t and making Q queries,∣∣∣Pr [DΓ∗τ,`,d(x,·) = 1; x $← Z`2]− Pr [DU`+1(·) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε,
where U`+1(·) on input v (where wt(v) ≥ d) outputs a sample of U`+1 and ⊥ otherwise.
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Remark 2.9. Γ∗τ,`,d(x,v) samples are of the form (r, r
T
↓vx↓v + e) ∈ Z`+12 , where e
$← Berτ . To
compute the inner product only r↓v ∈ Zwt(v)2 is needed, the remaining bits r↓v ∈ Z`−wt(v)2 are
irrelevant. We use this observation to improve the communication complexity (for protocols) or
tag length (for MACs), by using “compressed” samples of the form (r↓v, rT↓vx↓v + e) ∈ Zwt(v)+12 .
2.5 Hoeffding Inequality
We will several time use the following tail inequality known as Hoeffding’s inequality.
Theorem 2.10 ([26]). Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be i.i.d. Bernoulli variables with Pr[Xi = 1] = p and
X =
∑n
i=1Xi (so E[X] = np). Then, for  ≥ 0,
Pr[X − np ≥ n] ≤ e−22n
Pr[|X − np| ≥ n] ≤ 2e−22n.
The above also holds if the Xi are sampled without replacement.
3 Two-Round Authentication with Active Security
In this section we describe our new 2-round authentication protocol and prove its active security
under the hardness of the SLPN∗τ,2`,d problem, where d = `/(2 + γ) for some constant γ > 0.
• Public parameters. The authentication protocol has the following public parameters, where
τ, τ ′ are constants and `, n depend on the security parameter λ.6
` ∈ N length of the secret key s ∈ Z2`2
τ ∈]0, 1/2[ parameter of the Bernoulli error distribution Berτ
τ ′ = 1/4 + τ/2 acceptance threshold
n ∈ N number of parallel repetitions (we require ` ≥ 2n)
• Key Generation. Algorithm K(1λ) samples s $← Z2`2 and returns s as the secret key.
• Authentication Protocol. The 2-round authentication protocol with prover Pτ,n and verifier
Vτ ′,n is given in Figure 5.
Prover Pτ,n(s ∈ Z2`2 ) Verifier Vτ ′,n(s ∈ Z2`2 )
v←− v $← {x ∈ Z2`2 : wt(x) = `}
if wt(v) 6= ` abort
R
$← Z`×n2 ; e $← Bernτ
z := RT · s↓v + e ∈ Zn2
(R,z)−−−→ if rank(R) 6= n reject
if wt(z + RT · s↓v) > n · τ ′ reject, else accept
Figure 5: Two-round protocol AUTH with active security from the LPN assumption.
6The acceptance threshold τ ′ below can be any value in-between τ and 1/2. As we set it closer to 1/2, the
soundness error increases while the completeness error decreases. For concreteness, we set τ ′ exactly in-between τ
and 1/2.
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Theorem 3.1. For any constant γ > 0, let d = `/(2 + γ). If the SLPN∗τ,2`,d problem is (t, nQ, ε)-
hard then the authentication protocol from Figure 5 is (t′, Q, ε′)-secure against active adversaries,
where for constants cγ , cτ > 0 that depend only on γ and τ respectively,
t′ = t− poly(Q, `) ε′ = ε+Q · 2−cγ ·` + 2−cτ ·n = ε+Q · 2−Θ(n).
The protocol has completeness error 2−c′τ ·n + 2n−` ∈ 2−Θ(n) (as ` ≥ 2n) where c′τ > 0 depends only
on τ .
3.1 Proof of Completeness
We first bound the completeness error α of the authentication protocol. For any n ∈ N, τ ∈]0, 1/2[,
let
ατ,n := Pr[wt(e) > n · τ ′ : e $← Bernτ ]
(Thm.2.10)
≤ e−2(1/4−τ/2)2n def= 2−c′τ ·n (3.1)
denote the probability that n independent Bernoulli samples with bias τ contain more than a
τ ′ := 1/4 + τ/2 fraction of 1’s (i.e., n(1/4 + τ/2) − nτ = n(1/4 − τ/2) more than the expected
number).
The verifier performs the following two checks. In the first verification step, the verifier rejects
if the random matrix R does not have full rank. By Lemma B.1 (cf. Appendix B) the probability
of this event is ≤ 2n−`. Now, let e := z + RT · s↓v denote the noise added by Pτ,n. Then, in the
second verification step, the verifier rejects if wt(e) > n · τ ′. From Eq. (3.1), we have that this
happens with probability ατ,n. It follows that α ≤ 2n−` + 2−c′τ ·n.
3.2 Proof of Security
We first define some more terms that will be used later in the security proof. For a constant γ > 0,
let d = `/(2 + γ) (as in Theorem 3.1). Let α′`,d denote the probability that a random substring
of length ` chosen from a string of length 2` with Hamming weight `, has a Hamming weight less











= 2−cγ ·`. (3.2)
For τ ′ = 1/4 + τ/2, let α′′τ ′,n denote the probability that a random bitstring y ∈ Zn2 has Hamming
weight wt(y) ≤ n · τ ′. From the Hoeffding bound, it follows that there exists a constant cτ > 0
(only depending on τ), such that (below we use 1/2− τ ′ = 1/4− τ/2)









≤ 2e−2( 14− τ2 )
2
n def= 2−cτ ·n. (3.3)
We now prove security of the authentication protocol. Consider an oracle O which is either the
subset LPN oracle Γ∗τ,2`,d(x, ·) or U2`+1(·), as defined in Definition 2.8. We will construct an
adversary BO that uses A (who breaks the active security of AUTH with advantage ε′) in a black-
box way such that:
Pr[BΓ∗τ,2`,d(x,·) = 1] ≥ ε′ and Pr[BU2`+1(·) = 1] ≤ α′′τ ′,n +Q · α′`,d .
Thus BO can distinguish between the two oracles with advantage ε := ε′ − Q · α′`,d − α′′τ ′,n =
ε+Q · 2−cγ ·` + 2−cτ ·n as claimed in the statement of the Theorem. Below we define BO.
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Setup. Initially, BO samples
x∗ $← Z2`2 , v∗ $← {y ∈ Z2`2 : wt(y) = `}.
The intuition of our simulation below is as follows. Let us first assumeO is a subset LPN oracle
Γ∗τ,2`,d(x, ·) with secret x. To simulate the prover during the first phase we have to produce
answers φ = (R, z) to each query v ∈ {y ∈ Z2`2 : wt(y) = `} issued by A. The simulated
answers will have the same distribution as the answers of an honest prover Pτ,n(s ∈ Z2`2 )
where
s = (x∗ ∧ v∗) + (x ∧ v∗). (3.4)
Thus one half of the bits of s come from x∗, and the other half come from the unknown
secret x (for which we use the oracle O). In the second phase we give A the challenge v∗. As
s↓v∗ = (x∗ ∧v∗)↓v∗ = x∗↓v∗ is known, we will be able to verify if A did output a valid answer.
On the other hand, if O is the uniform oracle U2`+1(·), then after the interaction with the
prover we will show that s↓v∗ = (x∗ ∧ v∗)↓v∗ is information theoretically hidden, and thus A
cannot succeed except with exponentially small probability.
First phase. In the first phase BO invokes A who expects access to Pτ,n(s ∈ Z2`2 ) . We now specify
how BO samples the answer φ = (R, z) to a query v ∈ {y ∈ Z2`2 : wt(y) = `} made by A.
Let
u∗ := v ∧ v∗ u := v ∧ v∗.
1. BO queries its oracle n times on the input u. If the oracle’s output is ⊥ (this is the case
if wt(u) < d), then BO outputs 1 and stops. Otherwise let Rˆ1 ∈ Z2`×n2 , z1 ∈ Zn2 denote
the n outputs of the oracle.
2. Sample Rˆ0
$← Z2`×n2 and set z0 = RˆT0 · (x∗ ∧ u∗).
3. Return φ = (R = Rˆ↓v ∈ Z`×n2 , z = z0 + z1 ∈ Zn2 ), where Rˆ is uniquely determined by
requiring Rˆ↓v∗ = Rˆ0 and Rˆ↓v∗ = Rˆ1.
Second phase. Eventually, A enters the second phase of the active attack expecting a challenge
from Vτ ′,n(s ∈ Z2`2 ).
1. BO forwards v∗ as the challenge to A.
2. A answers with some (R∗, z∗).
3. BO checks if
rank(R∗) = n and wt(z∗ + R∗T · x∗↓v∗) ≤ n · τ ′. (3.5)
The output is 1 if both checks succeed and 0 otherwise.
Claim 3.2. Pr[BU2`+1(·) = 1] ≤ α′′τ ′,n +Q · α′`,d.
Proof of Claim. Recall that we defined B such that it will output 1 and stop in the first phase of
the experiment whenever it receives ⊥ as output from its oracle. We defined U2`+1(·) to output ⊥
if it is queried on an input u = v ∧ v∗ where wt(u) < d. Since v∗ $← {y ∈ Z2`2 : wt(y) = `}, for
any v, the probability that wt(v∧v∗) < d is (by definition) α′`,d as defined in Eq. (3.2). Using the
union bound, we can upper bound the probability that wt(v ∧ v∗) < d for any of the Q different
v’s chosen by the adversary in the first phase as Q · α′`,d.
If we did not output 1 in the first phase and in the second phase R∗ does not have full rank
then B outputs 0 by definition. Therefore, we now consider the case where rank(R∗) = n.
15
The answers φ = (R, z) that the adversary A obtained from BU2`+1(·) in the first phase are
independent of x∗ (i.e., z = z0 + z1 is uniform as z1 is uniform). Since x∗↓v∗ is uniformly random
and R∗ has full rank, the vector
y := R∗T · x∗↓v∗ + z∗
is uniformly random over Zn2 . Thus the probability that the second verification in Eq. (3.5) does
not fail is Pr[wt(y) ≤ n · τ ′] = α′′τ ′,n.
Claim 3.3. Pr[BΓ∗τ,2`,d(x,·) = 1] ≥ ε′
Proof of Claim. We will show that B outputs 1 with probability ≥ ε′ if the subset LPN oracle
accepts subsets of arbitrary small size (and does not simply output ⊥ on inputs v where wt(v) < d),
i.e.,
Pr[BΓ∗τ,2`,0(x,·) = 1] ≥ ε′. (3.6)
This then implies the claim using
Pr[BΓ∗τ,2`,d(x,·) = 1] ≥ Pr[BΓ∗τ,2`,0(x,·) = 1]
which holds as the oracles Γ∗τ,2`,d(x, ·) and Γ∗τ,2`,0(x, ·) behave the same except on inputs v with
wt(v) < d in which case the former outputs ⊥, and B will then immediately output 1.
Eq. (3.6) holds as:
• The answers φ = (R, z) that BΓ∗τ,2`,0(x,·) gives to A’s queries in the first phase of the attack
have exactly the same distribution as what A would get when interacting with an honest
prover Pτ,n(s ∈ Z2`2 ) where the “simulated” secret s is defined in Eq. (3.4).
To see this, recall that on a query v from A, adversary BΓ∗τ,2`,0(x,·) must compute n SLPN
samples (Rˆ, z = RˆT · (s∧v) + e) and then forward the compressed version of this samples to
A (that is, (R, z = RT · s↓v + e) where R = Rˆ↓v, cf. Remark 2.9). We next show that the
z computed by B indeed have exactly this distribution. In the first step, B queries its oracle
with u = v ∧ v∗ and obtains noisy inner products (Rˆ1, z1) with the part of s↓v that contains
only bits from x, i.e.,
z1 = Rˆ
T
1 · (x ∧ u) + e = RˆT1 · (s ∧ u) + e.
In the second step, B samples n inner products (Rˆ0, z0) (with no noise) with the part of s↓v
that contains only bits from the known x∗, i.e.,
z0 = Rˆ
T
0 · (x∗ ∧ u∗) = RˆT0 · (s ∧ u∗).
In the third step, B then generates (Rˆ, RˆT · (s ∧ v) + e) from the previous values where Rˆ is
defined by Rˆ↓v∗ = Rˆ0 and Rˆ↓v∗ = Rˆ1. Using v = u + u∗, we get
z = z0 + z1
= RˆT0 · (s ∧ u∗) + RˆT1 · (s ∧ u) + e
= RˆT · (s ∧ v) + e.
• The challenge v∗ sent initially to A is uniformly random, and therefore has the same distri-
bution as a challenge in an active attack.
• BΓ∗τ,2`,0(x,·) outputs 1 if Eq. (3.5) holds, which is exactly the case when A’s response to the
challenge was valid. By assumption this probability is at least ε′.
This concludes the proof of Eq. (3.6).
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3.3 Avoiding Checking
Pτ,n(s ∈ Z2`2 ,bv ∈ Z2`2 ,bz ∈ Zn2 ) Vτ ′,n(s,bv,bz)
v←− v $← Z2`2
R
$← Z2`×n2 ; e $← Bernτ
z := RT · (s ∧ (v + bv)) + bz + e
(R,z)−−−→ if wt((z + RT · (s ∧ (v + bv)))+ bz) > n · τ ′
reject, else accept
Figure 6: By blinding the values v, z with secret random vectors bv,bz we can avoid checking
whether wt(v) = ` and rank(R) = n as in the protocol from Figure 5.
One disadvantage of the protocol in Figure 5, compared to HB style protocols, is the necessity to
check whether the messages exchanged have the right form: the prover checks if v has weight `,
while the verifier must make the even more expensive check whether R has full rank. We note that
it is possible to eliminate these checks by blinding the exchanged messages v and z using random
vectors bv ∈ Z2`2 and bz ∈ Zn2 respectively, as shown in Figure 6. The analysis of this protocol is
similar as for the protocol in Figure 6, we thus just sketch a proof emphasising the differences.
The setup phase is as before, except that B apart from x∗ and v∗ also samples random bv and
bz. In the first phase BO will answer A’s queries as before, except that we use v + bv instead
of v and finally also add bv to the answer (just so when O is an SLPN oracle we get the same
distribution as in the protocol). Also the second phase is identical, except that we use the challenge
v∗ + bv (so the actual subset used to answer the challenge is v∗ + bv + bv = v∗).
Let α∗`,d denote the probability that a random string of length ` has Hamming weight less than
d, then we have Pr[BU2`+1(·) = 1] ≤ α′′τ ′,n + Q · α∗`,d, this is basically as in Claim 3.2, except that
α′`,d is replaced with α
∗
`,d. As b
v is uniformly random, the probability that wt((v+bv)∧v∗) < d is
α∗`,d (in which case the oracle will ouput ⊥), using the union bound this will not happen in any of
the Q queries except with probability at most Q · α∗`,d. In this argument we also must use the fact
that the answers that B sends to A are uniformly random, and thus do not leak any information
about bv (except from what can be deduced from the fact that B has not already output 1 and
stopped). If we come to the second phase, the probability that A comes up with a valid answer
(R∗, z∗) is at most α′′τ ′,n as at this point b
z, and thus also the string w =
(
z + RT · (s ∧ v∗))+ bz,
is uniformly random given A’s view, which implies that Pr[wt(w) > n · τ ′] ≤ α′′τ ′,n.
The proof that Pr[BΓ∗τ,2`,d(x,·) = 1] ≥ ε′ is almost analogous to the proof of Claim 3.3.
4 Message Authentication Codes
In this section, we construct two message authentication codes whose security can be reduced to
the LPN assumption. Our first construction is based on the 2-round authentication protocol from
Section 3. We prove that if the LPN problem is ε-hard, then no adversary making Q queries
can forge a MAC with probability more than Θ(
√
ε · Q). The construction is somewhat non-
uniform as to achieve this security, one must set a parameter in the construction as a function of ε
(cf. Remark 4.4). Our second construction has no such issues and achieves better security Θ(ε ·Q).
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The efficiency of this construction is similar to that of the first construction, but a larger key is
required.
4.1 First Construction
Recall the 2-round authentication protocol from Section 3. In the protocol the verifier chooses a
random challenge subset v. To turn this interactive protocol into a MAC, we will compute this v
from the message m to be authenticated as v = C(h(m,b)), where h is a pairwise independent hash
function, b ∈ Zν2 is some fresh randomness and C is some encoding scheme. The code C is fixed
and public, while the function h is part of the secret key. The authentication tag φ is computed
in the same manner as the prover’s answer in the authentication protocol. That is, we sample a
random matrix R ∈ Z`×n2 and compute a noisy inner product z := RT · s↓v + e, where e $← Bernτ .
We note that using (R, z,b) as an authentication tag would not be secure, and we need to blind
these values. This is done by applying a pairwise independent permutation (PIP) pi—which is part
of the secret key—to (R, z,b) ∈ Z`×n+n+ν2 .
Remark 4.1. In the construction it’s sufficient to just use almost pairwise independent functions
and permutations. In fact, if the message space M is a priory unbounded, we have to settle for
almost pairwise independence (as the description of a pairwise independent h is linear in the length
of the inputs it can process).
Construction. The message authentication code MAC1 = (K, T ,V) with associated message
space M is defined as follows.
• Public parameters. MAC1 has the following public parameters.7
`, τ, τ ′, n as in the authentication protocol from Section 3
µ ∈ N output length of the hash function
ν ∈ N length of the randomness
C : Zµ2 → Z2`2 encoding, where ∀ y 6= y′ ∈ Zµ2 we have wt(C(y)) = `
and wt(C(y) + C(y′)) ≥ 0.9`.
• Key generation. Algorithm K(1λ) samples s $← Z2`2 , a pairwise independent hash function
h : M× Zν2 → Zµ2 and a pairwise independent permutation pi over Z`×n+n+ν2 . It returns
K = (s, h, pi) as the secret key.
• Tagging. Given secret key K = (s, h, pi) and message m ∈M, algorithm T proceeds as follows.
1. R
$← Z`×n2 , b $← Zν2 , e $← Bernτ
2. v := C(h(m,b)) ∈ Z2`2
3. Return φ := pi(R,RT · s↓v + e,b)
• Verification. On input a secret-key K = (s, h, pi), message m ∈ M and tag φ, algorithm V
proceeds as follows.
1. Parse pi−1(φ) as (R ∈ Z`×n2 , z ∈ Zn2 ,b ∈ Zν2). If rank(R) 6= n, then return reject
2. v := C(h(m,b))
3. If wt(z + RT · s↓v) > n · τ ′ return reject, otherwise return accept
7The code C can be constructed as follows. We first sample a random matrix C ∈ Zµ×`2 and map y ∈ Zµ2 to
C(y) = (c ∈ Z`2, c′ ∈ Z`2) where c = CT · y and c′ = c. A random code C has high distance with high probability
and C(y) = (c, c′) has weight exactly `.
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Theorem 4.2. For µ = ν ∈ N, a constant γ > 0 and d := `/(2 + γ), if the SLPN∗τ,2`,d problem
is (t, nQ, ε)-hard then MAC1 is (t
′, Q, ε′)-secure against uf-cma adversaries, where for constants
cγ , cτ > 0 that depend only on γ and τ respectively, and for Q = Qtag +Qvrfy,








−Qtag · 2−cγ ·` −Qvrfy · 2−cτ ·n
}
.
MAC1 has completeness error 2
−c′τ ·n + 2n−` ∈ 2−Θ(n) where c′τ > 0 depends only on τ .
Corollary 4.3. Choosing µ s.t. 2µ = 4Q
2
ε′ in the above theorem, we get ε = min{ε′/4, ε′2/8Q2 −
Q · 2−Θ(n)}. The 2nd term is the minimum here, and solving for ε′ gives
ε′ ≤ 3Q ·
√
ε+Q · 2−Θ(n). (4.1)
Remark 4.4 (about µ). Note that to get security as claimed in the above corollary, we need to
choose µ as a function of Q and ε such that 2µ ≈ 4Q2/ε′ for ε′ as in Eq. (4.1). Of course we can
just fix Q (as an upper bound to the number of queries made by the adversary) and ε (as our guess
on the actual hardness of SLPN∗τ,2`,d). But a too conservative guess on µ (i.e. choosing µ too small)
will result in a construction whose security is worse than what is claimed in the above corollary. A
too generous guess on the other hand will make the security reduction meaningless, though we do
not have any attacks on the MAC for large µ.
We now give some intuition for the proof of Theorem 4.2. Every query (m,φ) to V and query m
to T defines a subset v (as computed in the second step in the definitions of both V and T ). We say
that a forgery (m,φ) is “fresh” if the v contained in (m,φ) is different from all v’s contained in all
the previous V and T queries. The proof makes a case distinction and uses a different reduction for
the two cases where the first forgery found by the adversary is more likely to be fresh, or more likely
to be non-fresh. In both cases we consider a reduction BO which has access to either a uniform
oracle O = U or a subset LPN oracle O = Γ∗. Adversary BO uses an adversary A who can find
forgeries for the MAC to distinguish those cases and thus break the subset LPN assumption. In
the first case, where the first forgery is likely to be non-fresh, we can show (using the fact that
a pairwise independent permutation is used to blind the tag) that if BO’s oracle is O = U , even
a computationally unbounded A cannot come up with a message/tag pair (m,φ) that contains a
non-fresh v. Thus we can distinguish the cases O = U and O = Γ∗ by just observing if A ever
makes a V query (m,φ) that contains a non-fresh v (even without being able to tell if (m,φ) is
valid or not).
If the first forgery found by A is more likely to be fresh, we can use a similar argument as in
the proof of our authentication protocol in the last section. An additional difficulty here is that the
reduction has to guess the fresh v ∈ Z2`2 (for which there are 2µ possibilities) contained in the first
forgery and cannot choose it itself as in the protocol. This is the reason why the reduction loses a
factor 2µ.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The proof of completeness is essentially the same (and we get exactly the
same quantitative bound) as the proof of completeness for the protocol in Figure 5 as claimed in
Theorem 3.1.
We now prove security. As in the theorem statement, we set µ = ν (but for clarity we will
keep the different letters µ for the range of h and ν for the length of the randomness). Let A
19
be an adversary running in time t′ that breaks the uf-cma security of MAC1 in the experiment
Expuf−cmaMAC1,A,λ with advantage ε
′. Let Qtag and Qvrfy denote the number of queries that A makes
to the tag and verification oracles respectively, such that Q = Qtag + Qvrfy. We assume that A
never makes the same verification query twice (since V is deterministic, repeating queries gives no
additional information to A) and also that she never makes a verification query (m,φ) where φ was
received as the output from the tag oracle on input m. Since the completeness error of MAC1 is
2−Θ(n), this is basically without loss of generality (as the answer would almost certainly be accept).
Every verification query (m,φ) and tag query m defines a subset v (as computed in step 2. in the
definitions of both V and T ).
By definition, in the uf-cma experiment, with probability ε′ the adversary A at some point
makes a verification query (m,φ) where: (i) φ was not received as output on a tag query m,
and (ii) V(K,m, φ) = accept. We say that such a forgery (m,φ) is “fresh” if the v defined by
(m,φ) is different from all v’s defined by all the previous verification and tag queries. Let Efresh
denote the event that the first forgery found by A is fresh. We will consider the two cases where
Pr[Efresh] > ε
′/2 and Pr[Efresh] ≤ ε′/2 separately.
The case Pr[Efresh] ≤ ε′/2. Given A, we will construct an adversary BO1 who can distinguish





BO1 samples pi, h (but not s) as defined by K. Next, it invokes A (who expects to attack MAC1 with
a key (s, h, pi)) answering its queries as follows:
• Tag queries. If A makes a tag query m, then BO1 does the following:
1. Sample b
$← Zν2 and compute v := C(h(m,b)).
2. Query the oracle O for n times on input v: for i = 1, . . . , n let (R[i], z[i]) $← O(v).
3. Return φ := pi(R, z,b) where R = [R[1], . . . ,R[n]] and z = [z[1], . . . , z[n]] to A.
• Verification queries. If A makes a verification query (m,φ), BO1 simply answers with reject.
If any tag or verification query contains a v which has appeared in a previous query, BO1 outputs 1
and 0 otherwise. (Note that BO1 can compute the value v in a verification query as it knows pi, h.)
Claim 4.5. If O = Γ∗τ,2`,`(s, ·), then BO1 outputs 1 with probability ≥ ε′/2.
Proof of Claim. The answers to the tag queries of A computed by BO1 have exactly the same
distribution as in the uf-cma experiment (where the secret key is (s, h, pi)). (Note that each tag
query yields a vector v with hamming weight exactly `.) The answers to the verification queries
(which are always reject) are correct as long as A does not query a valid forgery. The probability
that the first valid forgery found by A is not fresh is ε′−Pr[Efresh] ≥ ε′− ε′/2 ≥ ε′/2, which is thus
a lower bound on the probability that BO1 outputs 1.
Claim 4.6. If O = U2`+1(·), then BO1 outputs 1 with probability < Q2/2µ.
Proof of Claim. The answers that A obtains on a tag query m from BU2`+1(·)1 (i.e., pi(R, z,b) where
R, z,b are sampled uniformly) are uniformly random, and in particular independent of h or pi. The
answers to verification queries are always reject, and thus contain no information about h, pi either.
Then, we have that vi = vj (where vi = C(h(mi,bi)) is defined by the i-th tag or verification
query) iff h(mi,bi) = h(mj ,bj). We will upper bound the probability of such a collision, which
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then is also an upper bound on the probability that BO1 outputs 1. A makes a total of Q queries.
Assume that up to the (i− 1)th query, all the v’s were distinct.
If the ith query is a tag query mi, a fresh bi is sampled which will collide with a previous bj
(j < i) with probability at most (i− 1)/2ν . Assuming no such collision happened, the probability
that h(mi,bi) = h(mj ,bj) for any j < i can be upper bounded by (i− 1)/2µ (here we use the fact
that the answers that A gets from BU2`+1(·)1 are uniformly random, and thus A has no information
about the function h).
If the ith query is a verification query (mi, φi), then using the fact that pi is a pairwise indepen-
dent permutation (and A has no information about it) we get that pi−1(φi) = (Ri, zi,bi) contains
a bi which will collide with a previous bj (j < i) where φj 6= φi with probability at most (i−1)/2ν .
If we have no such collision, then also (mi,bi) 6= (mj ,bj) for all j < i as for j where φi = φj
we must have that mi 6= mj .8 If (mi,bi) 6= (mj ,bj) for all j < i we can again upper bound the
probability that h(mi,bi) = h(mj ,bj) for some j < i by (i− 1)/2µ.
We showed that for the ith query (no matter if it’s a tag or verification query) the probability
that h(mi,bi) = h(mj ,bj) for some j ≤ i is at most (i−1)2ν + (i−1)2µ . Taking the union bound over








≤ Q2/2µ (recall that µ = ν) as claimed.
The case Pr[Efresh] > ε
′/2. In this case, A will make tag/verification queries, where with probabil-
ity > ε′/2, at some point she will make an accepting verification query (m,φ) that defines a fresh v.
We now construct an adversary BO2 that uses A as a black-box, and can distinguish O = Γ∗τ,2`,d(s, ·)
from O = U2`+1(·) (as in Definition 2.8) with advantage
ε′
2µ+1
−Qtag · α′`,d −Qvrfy · α′′τ ′,n. (4.3)
The construction of BO2 is very similar to the adversary B that we constructed in the proof of
Theorem 3.1 (where we proved that the authentication protocol in Figure 5 is secure against active
attacks). The queries to the prover in the first phase of an active attack directly correspond to
tag queries. However, we now have to additionally answer verification queries (we will always
answer reject). Furthermore, we cannot choose the challenge v∗. Instead, we will simply hope
that (in the case where O = Γ∗τ,2`,d(s, ·)) the v contained in the first valid verification query (i.e.,
forgery) that A makes is fresh (which by assumption happens with probability ε′/2). Moreover,
we will hope that it is the unique v∗ (out of 2µ possible ones) for which BO2 can verify this. This
gives us a distinguishing advantage of nearly (ε′/2)/2µ = ε′/2µ+1 as stated in Eq. (4.3). We do
lose an additional additive term Qtag · α′`,d as there is an exponentially small probability that the
transformation of subspace LPN samples to tag queries will fail, and moreover an exponentially
small term Qvrfy ·α′′τ ′,n which accounts for the probability that A correctly guesses an accepting tag
even in the case where O = U2`+1(·).
BO2 samples pi, h (but not s) as defined by K, and y∗ $← Zµ2 , s∗ $← Z2`2 . Let v∗ := C(y∗). Next,
BO2 invokes A and answers its queries as follows (the intuition for the sampling below is given in
the proof of Claim 4.8).
• Tag queries. The answer φ to a tag query m ∈M is computed by BO2 as follows:
8Recall that we assume that A does not repeat queries and does not ask verification queries (m,φ) if φ was the
output of a tag query m.
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1. Sample b
$← Zν2 and compute v := C(h(m,b)).
Let u := v ∧ v∗ and u∗ := v ∧ v∗.
2. For i = 1, . . . , n, let (R′[i], z′[i]) $← O(u), R′′[i] $← Z2`2 and z′′[i] := 〈R′′[i], s∗ ∧ u∗〉.
Define R = [R[1],R[2], . . . ,R[n]] and z = [z[1], . . . , z[n]] where R[i] := (R′[i] ∧ u +
R′′[i] ∧ u∗)↓v and z[i] := z′[i] + z′′[i].
3. Return φ := pi(R, z,b) to A.
• Verification queries. If A makes a verification query (φ,m), then BO2 always answers reject,
but also makes the following check:
1. Parse y := pi−1(φ) as [R ∈ Z`×n2 , z ∈ Zn2 ,b ∈ Zν2 ] and compute v := C(h(m,b)).
2. If v 6= v∗, processing this query is over, otherwise go to the next step.
3. If rank(R) = n and wt(RT · s∗↓v∗ + z) ≤ n · τ ′ (i.e. we have a forgery) output 1 and stop.
If A has finished its queries, BO2 stops with output 0.
Claim 4.7. If O = U2`+1(·), then BO2 outputs 1 with probability ≤ Qvrfy · α′′τ ′,n +Qtag · α′`,d.
Proof of Claim. The proof of this claim is almost identical to the proof of Claim 3.2, except that here
we have an additional factor Qvrfy as we have to take the union bound over all Qvrfy queries, whereas
in Claim 3.2 the adversary was (by definition of an active attack) only allowed one guess.




Proof. The proof of this claim is similar to the proof of Claim 3.3. That is, one shows that B2 with
oracle access to Γ∗τ,2`,0(s, ·) (i.e., the subset LPN oracle accepts subsets of arbitrarily small size)
perfectly simulates the experiment and thus receive a fresh forgery from A with probability at least
ε′/2. Unlike in Claim 3.3, here B2 will only be able to recognise a fresh forgery if it’s using a v that
is equivalent to v∗, this accounts for the extra 2−µ factor.
Summing up, using A we can break the subset LPN assumption with advantage which is given













We now give the construction of another MAC based on the hardness of the LPN problem. The
main difference from MAC1 from the last subsection is the way we generate the values s(v). In the
new construction we define s(v) = s0 + S · v, where S ∈ Z`×µ2 and s0 ∈ Z`2 are both part of the
secret key. Moreover, in the computation of a tag, the output is masked via another vector s′0 ∈ Zn2
that is also included in the secret key. The construction borrows ideas from [4], that we needed to
adapt to the case of LPN.
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Construction. The message authentication code MAC2 = (K, T ,V) with associated message
space M is defined as follows.
• Public parameters. MAC2 has the following public parameters.
`, τ, τ ′, n as in the authentication protocol from Section 3
µ ∈ N output length of the hash function
ν ∈ N length of the randomness
• Key generation. Algorithm K(1λ) samples S $← Z`×µ2 , s0 $← Z`2, s′0 $← Zn2 and chooses an almost
pairwise independent hash function h :M×Zν2 → Zµ2 \{0}, as well as a pairwise independent
permutation pi over Z`×n+n+ν2 (cf. Remark 4.1). It returns K = (S, s0, s′0, h, pi) as the secret
key.
• Tagging. Given secret key K = (S, s0, s′0, h, pi) and message m ∈M, algorithm T proceeds as
follows.
1. R
$← Z`×n2 , b $← Zν2 , e $← Bernτ
2. v := h(m,b)
3. s(v) := s0 + S · v
4. Return φ := pi(R, s′0 + RT · s(v) + e,b)
• Verification. On input a secret-key K = (S, s0, s′0, h, pi), message m ∈M and tag φ, algorithm
V proceeds as follows.
1. Parse pi−1(φ) as (R ∈ Z`×n2 , z ∈ Zn2 ,b ∈ Zν2). If rank(R) 6= n, then return reject
2. v := h(m,b)
3. s(v) := s0 + S · v
4. If wt(z + s′0 + RT · s(v)) > n · τ ′ return reject, otherwise return accept
Theorem 4.9. For µ = ν ∈ N, if the SLPNτ,`,` problem is (t, nQ, ε)-hard (by Proposition 2.3 this
problem is as hard as LPNτ,`), then MAC2 is (t
′, Q, ε′)-secure against uf-cma adversaries, where for
constants cτ , c
′
τ > 0 that depend only on τ , and for Q = Qtag +Qvrfy,








−Qvrfy · (2−c′τ ·n + 2−cτ ·n)
}
.
MAC2 has completeness error 2
−c′τ ·n + 2n−`.
We now give intuition for the proof of Theorem 4.9. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2, we
distinguish fresh and non-fresh forgeries. Here the new and interesting case is when the the first
forgery found by the adversary is fresh. In the analysis we move to a mental experiment where
tags computed by the tag oracle are uniform and independent from the secret key. The technical
heart of the proof is to show that such a modification defines an indistinguishable distribution,
assuming that the standard LPN assumption holds. More in detail, consider the two experiments
defined in Figure 7. In the “real experiment”, the answers from the Eval(v) oracle have the same
distribution as the values (R, z) from a tag on message m such that h(m,b) = v; in the “random
experiment”, the answers from the Eval(v) oracle are uniform. Oracle Chal(R∗,v∗), which can
be queried at most once, essentially corresponds to the output of a verification query on a fresh
forgery (m∗, φ∗), such that h(m∗,b∗) = v∗. The lemma below states that it is hard to distinguish
the two cases. Its proof uses a hybrid technique from [13, 4].
Lemma 4.10. Let `, µ, n, τ ∈ N. Assume that the LPNτ,` problem is (t, nQ, ε)-hard. Then, for all
adversaries B running in time t′ ≈ t, and asking Q queries to the Eval(·) oracle, we have that∣∣∣Pr [Expreal`,µ,n,τ (B)) = 1]− Pr [Exprand`,µ,n,τ (B)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ 4µε.
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Expreal`,µ,n,τ (B), Exprand`,µ,n,τ (B)
Qv := ∅
S
$← Z`×µ2 ; s0 $← Z`2; s′0 $← Zn2
{0, 1} 3 d← BEval(·),Chal(·,·)(1λ)
Return d ∧ (v∗ 6∈ Qv)
Oracle Chal(R∗,v∗) // one query
s(v∗) = s0 + S · v∗
Return z∗ = s′0 + R∗T · s(v∗)
Oracle Eval(v)
Qv := Qv ∪ {v}
s(v) = s0 + S · v
R
$← Z`×n2 ; e $← Bernτ
z = s′0 + RT · s(v) + e; z $← Zn2
Return (R, z)
Figure 7: Experiments Expreal`,µ,n,τ (B) and Exprand`,µ,n,τ (B) . The boxed statement redefining z is only
executed in Exprand`,µ,n,τ .
Proof. We start by making a syntactical change in the real experiment. Let S = (S[j])j∈[µ], with
S[j] ∈ Z`2. One can show that there exist vectors sj,k ∈ Z`2 for j ∈ [µ] and k ∈ {0, 1} such that




This is obtained by letting s0 =
∑µ
j=1 sj,0, and S[j] = sj,1 − sj,0. Furthermore, choosing the sj,k
uniformly at random yields uniformly distributed values S, s0.
Let G0 be identical to the “real experiment” Exp
real
`,µ,n,τ (B), with the difference that at the
beginning of the experiment we sample the vectors si,j (as defined above) uniformly at random,
instead of sampling (S, s0), and later those vectors are used to define s(v). Clearly, G0 is identically
distributed to the “real experiment”.
We prove the lemma by considering a sequence of intermediate games, starting with game G0.
The games are shown in Figure 8. Note that in Game G1,0 the value s
′
0 is computed as RF0(⊥),
where ⊥ is the empty string, that always outputs the same vector s′0 $← Z`2. Therefore, we have
Claim 4.11. Pr[G0 = 1] = Pr[G1,0 = 1].
The next claim shows that any two adjacent hybrid games are indistinguishable, if the LPN
assumption holds.
Claim 4.12. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , µ − 1}, there exists a distinguisher D, with running time similar
to that of B, such that∣∣∣Pr [DΛτ,`(s) = 1; s $← Z`2]− Pr [DU`+1 = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ 12 |Pr [G1,i+1 = 1]− Pr [G1,i = 1]| .
Proof. Fix some particular i ∈ [µ− 1], and let Q be the total number of queries that B asks to the
Eval(·) oracle. Distinguisher DO will ask nQ queries to its oracle O(·), where O is either equal to
Λτ,`(s) or to U`+1. Looking ahead, distinguisher D will start by sampling a bit b $← {0, 1} as its
guess for v∗[i+ 1] and defining the random function RFi+1(·) recursively as
RFi+1(v[1 . . . i+ 1]) =
{
RFi(v[1 . . . i]) if v[i+ 1] = b
RFi(v[1 . . . i]) + RF
′






$← Z`2, ∀j ∈ [µ]
s′0
$← Zn2 ; s′0 := ⊥
{0, 1} 3 d← BEval(·),Chal(·,·)(1λ)
Return d ∧ (v∗ 6∈ Qv)
Oracle Chal(R∗,v∗) // one query
s′0 = RFi(v




z∗ = s′0 + R∗T · s(v∗); z∗ $← Z`2
Return z∗
Oracle Eval(v)
Qv := Qv ∪ {v}; R $← Z`×n2 ; e $← Bernτ
z = s′0 + RT · (
∑µ
j=1 sj,v[j]) + e
z = RFi(v[1 . . . i]) + R
T · (∑µj=1 sj,v[j]) + e
z = RFµ(v)
Return (R, z)
Figure 8: Hybrid experiments G0, G1,i and G2 in the proof of Lemma 4.10. Here RFi : {0, 1}i →
Z`2 is a random function, and v[1 . . . i] ∈ Zi2, for i ∈ [µ], is the i-th prefix of vector v ∈ Zµ2
where RF′i : {0, 1}i → Z`2 is another random function (to be determined). One can verify that, in
case RFi(·) is a random function, so is RFi+1(·). A formal description of D follows:
1. At setup D does the following:
• Sample b $← {0, 1} and set Qv := ∅.
• Choose all the vectors sj,k $← Z`2 at random (for all j ∈ [µ] and k ∈ {0, 1}), except for
si+1,1−b which is implicitly set to be the vector s from the LPN oracle.
• Query the O(s) oracle for nQ times, obtaining answers (Rj , z′j)j∈[Q]; let Li be an initially
empty list.
2. Upon input a query v to oracle Eval(·), distinguisher D does the following:
• Update Qv := Qv ∪ {v}.
• If v[i + 1] = b, sample R $← Z`×n2 and e $← Bernτ , compute z = RFi(v[1 . . . i]) + RT ·
(
∑µ
j=1 sj,v[j]) + e, and return (R, z).
• Else, in case v[i+1] = 1−b, check whether there exists an entry of the form (v[1, . . . , i], (Rj ,
z′j)) in the list Li, for some j ∈ [Q]. If this is the case, let (R, z′) := (Rj , z′j), otherwise
let (R, z′) := (Rj , z′j) for the next (in lexicographic order) not already used LPN sample,
and add (v[1, . . . , i], (Rj , z
′
j)) to the list Li. Define







and return (R, z).
3. Upon input query (R∗,v∗) to oracle Chal(·), distinguisher D does the following:
• In case v∗[i+ 1] 6= b, abort.
• Else, define s(v∗) = ∑µj=1 sj,v∗[j].
• Return z∗ = R∗T · s(v∗) + RFi(v∗[1 . . . i]).
4. Upon input the decision bit d from B, distinguisher D returns d ∧ (v∗ 6∈ Qv).
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Suppose that D correctly guessed v∗[i+ 1], which happens with probability 1/2. Note that in this
case D simulates perfectly the answer of the Chal(·) oracle (as it knows si+1,b). It remains to
analyze the distribution of oracle Eval(·). Below we argue that, depending on the value of v[i+1],
the distribution will either equal that of Gi or Gi+1, with random functions RFi+1 as defined in
Eq. (4.4). In case v[i+ 1] = b, then the distribution is equal to that of both Gi and Gi+1 (which is
the same, as in this case RFi+1(v[1 . . . i+ 1]) = RFi(v[1 . . . i])). In case v[i+ 1] = 1− b, we consider
two cases depending on whether the oracle O(s) outputs LPN samples or uniform samples. In the
first case, we have z′ = RT · si+1,1−b + e and thus the answer






T · si+1,1−b + e





is distributed like in game Gi. In the second case, we have z
′ = RT · si+1,1−b + e + u (for a uniform
u
$← Zn2 ). Thus, the answer z computed by D is distributed like in Gi+1 with random function
RF′i(v[1 . . . i]) = u and RFi+1 defined as in Eq. (4.4). Note that RF
′
i is well-defined, i.e., the value
RF′i(v[1, · · · i]) does not get overwritten in case the Eval(·) oracle is queried on two different v,v′
that are equal in the first i positions (this is because the reduction keeps track of which LPN sample
is associated to each of the vectors v[1 . . . i], using the list Li). The claim follows.
Claim 4.13. Pr[G1,µ = 1] = Pr[G2 = 1].
Proof. The claim follows from the fact that in G1,µ all outputs computed via Eval(·) are masked
by RFµ(v) and thus are independent of sj,k. Hence, the output of Chal(·) is uniform.
Finally, we make all steps in reverse order to re-obtain the initial distribution in the Eval(·)
oracle. The proof of the following claim is analogous to the one of Claim 4.12 and is therefore
omitted.
Claim 4.14. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , µ − 1}, there exists a distinguisher D, with running time similar
to that of B, such that∣∣∣Pr [DΛτ,`(s) = 1; s $← Z`2]− Pr [DU`+1 = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ 12 ∣∣∣Pr [G2 = 1]− Pr [Exprand`,µ,n,τ (B) = 1]∣∣∣ .
The statement of Lemma 4.10 now follows by putting together Claim 4.11—4.14.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 4.9.
Proof of Theorem 4.9. The proof of the completeness error is similar to the schemes before and is
therefore omitted. As for security, let A be an adversary that successfully forges in the uf-cma
experiment with probability ε′. Assume that A asks a total of Q = Qtag +Qvrfy queries, where Qtag
(resp., Qvrfy) stands for the total number of queries asked to the tag (resp., verification) oracle.
We make the same conventions and the definition of freshness as in the proof of Theorem 4.2 and
consider the two cases Pr[Efresh] ≤ ε′/2 and Pr[Efresh] > ε′/2 separately.
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The case Pr[Efresh] ≤ ε′/2. We now give the description of BO1 attacking the SLPNτ,`,` problem,





Adversary BO1 samples pi, h,S, s′0 (but not s0) as defined by K and B $← Z`×µ2 . Next, it implicitly
defines s0 as s0 = s, where s is only implicitly defined through Γτ,`,`(s, ·, ·). It is easy to see that
with this setup of K = (S, s0, s
′
0, h, pi) we have that, for each v ∈ Zµ2 \ {0},
s(v) = s0 + S · v = s + S · v. (4.6)
Note that S · v is known to B1. Adversary BO1 cannot evaluate s(v) but looking ahead, it will use
its oracle O to answer A’s queries as follows.
• Tag queries. If A makes a tag query for message m ∈M, then BO1 does the following:
1. Samples b
$← Zν2 and compute v := h(m,b).
2. Query the oracle O on (I,S · v) for n times to obtain (R, z′): for i = 1, . . . , n let
(R[i], z′[i]) $← O(I,S · v). Here I is the identity matrix.
3. Return φ := pi(R, s′0 + z′,b).
• Verification queries. If A makes a verification query (m,φ), BO1 simply answers with reject.
Finally, if any tag or verification query contains a v which has appeared in a previous query, BO1
outputs 1 and stops. Otherwise, it outputs 0. Note that if O = Γτ,`,`(s, ·, ·), then BO1 perfectly
simulates the T (K, ·) algorithm, as z′[i] = R[i]T(I · s + S · v) + e[i] = R[i]T · s(v) + e[i].
The following two claims are the analogues of Claim 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. Their proofs are
essentially the same and are therefore omitted.
Claim 4.15. If O = Γτ,`(s, ·, ·), then BO1 outputs 1 with probability ≥ ε′/2.
Claim 4.16. If O = U`+1(·, ·), then BO1 outputs 1 with probability < Q
2
2µ .
The case Pr[Efresh] > ε
′/2. We will use games, denoting by Gi the output of the ith game. Game
G0 runs the uf-cma security experiment Exp
uf−cma
MAC2,A,λ and defines the output as 1 iff event Efresh
holds. By definition we have Pr[G0 = 1] = Pr[Efresh] > ε
′/2. Throughout the rest of the proof, if in
the game A finds a forgery, and the first forgery is fresh, we’ll denote with ·∗ the values associated
with this first forgery. In particular, v∗ is the v-value computed to evaluate the verification query
on (m∗, φ∗). Note that, by definition, v∗ is fresh, i.e., it is different from all the v-values from
previous tag and verification queries. Without loss of generality, we assume that after G0 processes
a verification query with respect to v∗, as defined above, the random variable corresponding to the
outcome of the game is defined and the experiment stops without processing any further query.
For simplicity, we also assume that the answer to all verification queries (m,φ) before the forgery
is found is reject, unless the pair (m,φ) was returned by the tag oracle (in which case we assume
the answer is always accept); this results in a loss of at most Qvrfy · α in the final bound, where
α := 2n−` + 2−c′τ ·n is the completeness error of MAC2.
Consider games G1, . . . ,GQvrfy where game Gj is identical to G0, but allows the adversary A to
ask only j verification queries. Define Ejfresh to be the event that in G0 the j-th verification query
is the one where the first fresh forgery is found; this means that all previous verification queries
are either rejected, or relative to a pair (m,φ) previously returned by the tag oracle. Since, for
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j ∈ {1, . . . , Qvrfy}, all the events Ejfresh are disjoint, and additionally Pr[Gj = 1] ≥ Pr[Ejfresh], we
have:













Pr [Gj = 1] . (4.7)
In the remainder of the proof, we will upper bound Pr[Gj = 1], for all j ∈ {1, . . . , Qvrfy}. As a
first step, consider a modified version G′j of Game Gj where the tag oracle internally uses uniform
z ∈ Zn2 , instead of z = s′0 + RT · s(v), to generate tag φ on message m.
Claim 4.17.
∣∣∣Pr[Gj = 1]− Pr[G′j = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ 4µε, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , Qvrfy}.
Proof. Fix a value of j ∈ {1, . . . , Qvrfy}. We prove something stronger, namely that the distributions
induced by Gj and G
′
j are computationally close, within distance 4µε. Assume the contrapositive,
namely that there exists a distinguisher D that can distinguish games Gj and G′j . We build an
attacker B (running D) such that∣∣∣Pr [Expreal`,µ,n,τ (B) = 1]− Pr [Exprand`,µ,n,τ (B) = 1]∣∣∣ > 4µε,
contradicting Lemma 4.10. Adversary B works as follows.
1. At the beginning B samples h, pi (but not S, s0, s′0).
2. Upon input a query m to the tag oracle, B does the following:
• Sample a random b $← Zν2 and compute v = h(m,b).
• Query v to oracle Eval(·), obtaining a pair (R, z), and forward φ = pi(R, z,b) to D.
3. Upon input a verification query (m,φ) to the verification oracle, B does the following:
• First check whether (m,φ) is equal to one of the tags previously returned to D; if this
is the case answer with accept.
• Otherwise, check whether (m,φ) is the j-th verification query; if this is not the case,
then answer with reject.
• Else, (m,φ) is the j-th verification query; call it (m∗, φ∗). Let (R∗, z∗,b∗) = pi−1(φ∗),
compute v∗ = h(m∗,b∗) and forward (R∗,v∗) to oracle Chal(·) obtaining a vector z′.
Check that wt(z′ + z∗) ≤ n · τ ′; if this is the case return accept to D, otherwise return
reject.
4. Finally B outputs whatever D does.
For the analysis, note that B runs in time similar to that of D. By inspection, one can verify that in
case B is running in the “real experiment” or in the “random experiment”, the simulation of the tag
queries provided by B is distribute like in Gj or in G′j , respectively. Finally, all verification queries
before the j-th query are either answered with accept (in case they are identical to a previously
simulated tag), or with reject (otherwise); this is consistent with both games Gj and G
′
j . The j-th
verification query is fresh by definition, and is simulated using the answer from the Chal(·) oracle,
so it has the right distribution. The claim follows.
Claim 4.18. Pr[G′j = 1] ≤ α′′τ ′,n, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , Qvrfy}.
Proof of Claim. Fix a value of j ∈ {1, . . . , Qvrfy}. If R∗ does not have full rank then the experiment
outputs 0 by definition. So from now we only consider the case where rank(R∗) = n. In Game
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∗) is uniformly random and R∗ has full rank, the vector x := s′0+R∗
T ·s(v∗)+z∗
is uniformly random over Zn2 . Thus the probability that the second verification wt(z∗ + s′0 + R∗
T ·
s(v∗)) ≤ n · τ ′ passes is Pr[wt(x) ≤ n · τ ′] = α′′τ ′,n = 2−Θ(n).
Summing up, in the case Pr[Efresh] > ε
′/2 (combining the bounds in Claim 4.17—4.18 together
with Eq. (4.7)), we can use A to break the LPN assumption with advantage ε′8µQvrfy−Qvrfy ·(α+α′′τ ′,n).
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A Extensions
In this section we discuss some extensions of the protocols we presented in Section 3 and Section 4.
A.1 Trading Key Size for Communication Complexity
A disadvantage of the schemes proposed in this paper is their large communication complexity.
For example, in the authentication protocol from Section 3 the prover has to send the entire `× n
matrix R to the verifier. Similarly, in the MACs from Section 4, the tag is computed by permuting
a string of the form (R,RT · s(m) + e,b), where again R is an `× n matrix.
We now explain a simple tradeoff that is originally due to Gilbert et al. [22]. Consider the
authentication protocol from Section 3. Let 1 ≤ c ≤ n be an integer parameter and let ns := c and
nr := n/c. The idea is to use a larger secret matrix S ∈ Z2`×ns2 (instead of just one vector s) and
a smaller random matrix R ∈ Z`×nr2 (instead of R ∈ Z`×n2 ). The resulting protocol is illustrated in
Figure 9. Similar extensions can be easily derived for the MACs of Section 4, where the tradeoff
is more important due to the pairwise independent permutation pi which is the computational
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P(S, τ, nr, ns) V(S, τ ′, nr, ns)
v←− v $← {x ∈ Z2`2 : wt(x) = `}
if wt(v) 6= ` abort
R
$← Z`×nr2 ; e $← Bernr×nsτ
z := RT · S↓v + e
z,R−−→ if rank(R) 6= nr reject
if wt(RT · S↓v + z) > nr · ns · τ ′ reject else accept
Figure 9: A generalization of the protocol from Figure 5 where we trade a larger key (which now
is a matrix S ∈ Z2`×ns2 ) for lower communication and randomness complexity. The protocol is as
secure as the protocol from Figure 6 (which is the special case where nr = n and ns = 1) with
n = nr · ns.
bottleneck of the protocol. See Figure 3 for a comparison of the resulting complexities. The proof
of Theorem 3.1, Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.9 can be adapted to show the same security and
completeness results.
A.2 An alternative Two-Round Authentication Protocol
In this section we describe an alternative 2-round authentication protocol and sketch the proof of its
active security under the hardness of the SLPNτ,`,` problem. The difference with the scheme from
Section 3 is the way the session key s(v) is computed. Whereas in the AUTH protocol from Figure 5
the session key is computed as s(v) = s↓v, in the new protocol it is computed as s(v) = Mvs0 + s1,
where Mv ∈ Z`×`2 is the matrix representation of a finite field multiplication with v (see definition
below), and (s0, s1) ∈ Z`2 is the secret key.
Definition A.1. For c ∈ Z`2, let Mc ∈ Z`×`2 denote the matrix of the linear map implementing the
finite field multiplication with c when interpreted as an element in F2` .9
The statement below follows directly from the properties of finite fields:
for all distinct vectors a,b ∈ Z`2, Ma −Mb is an invertible matrix. (A.1)
The mapping ϕ(c) = Mc is called encoding with full-rank differences in [10]. An explicit construc-
tion was given in [14].
We are now ready to define the modified authentication protocol. Even though the protocol is
less efficient than AUTH, it has a considerably simpler proof.
• Public parameters. The authentication protocol has the following public parameters, where
τ, τ ′ are constants and `, n depend on the security parameter λ.
` ∈ N length of the secret keys s0, s1 ∈ Z`2
τ ∈]0, 1/2[ parameter of the Bernoulli error distribution Berτ
τ ′ = 1/4 + τ/2 acceptance threshold
n ∈ N number of parallel repetitions (we require n ≤ `/2)
• Key Generation. Algorithm K(1λ) samples s0, s1 $← Z`2 and returns (s0, s1) as the secret key.
9This representation is unique once the irreducible polynomial f defining F2` = F2[x]/(f) is fixed.
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• Authentication Protocol. The 2-round authentication protocol with prover Pτ,n and verifier
Vτ ′,n is given in Figure 10.
Prover Pτ,n((s0, s1) ∈ Z`2) Verifier Vτ ′,n((s0, s1) ∈ Z`2)
v←− v $← Z`2
R
$← Z`×n2 ; e $← Bernτ
s(v) := Mvs0 + s1.
z := RT · s(v) + e ∈ Zn2
(R,z)−−−→ if rank(R) 6= n reject
if wt(z + RT · s(v)) > n · τ ′ reject, else accept
Figure 10: Two-round protocol AUTH2 with active security from the LPN assumption.
We now sketch the reduction from the SLPNτ,`,` assumption. It is similar to the one of Theorem
3.1, with a slightly different setup of adversary B. Let s be the secret of the SLPN oracle. In the
reduction, B first samples a random v∗ ∈ Z`2 that will be used as the challenge and implicitly defines
the secret key (s0, s1) as
s0 := s
s1 := −Mv∗s + c,
for c
$← Z`2. This way we have
s(v) =
{
(Mv −Mv∗)s + c v 6= v∗
c v = v∗,
where Mv −Mv∗ is guaranteed to be an invertible matrix by Eq. (A.1). This way, all adversarial
queries v 6= v∗ made in the first phase can be answered by returning (R, z) obtained from the SLPN
oracle (by calling it with the parameters SLPN(Mv−Mv∗ , c). As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, the
one challenge verification query corresponding to v∗ can be correctly answered with accept or reject
as s(v∗) does not depend on s. This way all answers z in the first phase can be switched from real
to random, without the adversary noticing it under the SLPN assumption. Once all answers in the
first phase are uniform and independent of the secret key, one can again argue that the adversary
has no chance in winning the second phase.
A.3 Generalization to LWE
All the protocols presented in this paper are based on the hardness of the LPN problem. A
natural generalization of this problem is the learning with errors (LWE) problem [41]. The most
appealing characteristic of this problem is that it enjoys for certain parameters a worst-case hardness
guarantee [41, 39]. We informally recall the LWE problem below. Let q ≥ 2 be a prime and denote
with Gauq,τ the so called “discretized normal error” distribution parametrized by some τ ∈]0, 1[.
This distribution is obtained by drawing x ∈ R from the Gaussian distribution of width τ (i.e., x is
chosen with probability 1τ exp(−pix2/τ2)) and outputting bq · xe mod q. For a random secret s ∈ Z`q,
the (decisional) LWEq,τ,` problem is to distinguish samples of the form (r, r
T · s + e) from uniformly
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random samples in Z`q×Zq, where r $← Z`q, e $← Gauq,τ and all the operations are performed modulo
q. The subspace/subset version of the LWE problem can be defined exactly in the same fashion
as for LPN (cf. Definition 2.2). It was showed in [40] that the subspace/subset LWE problems are
equivalent to the LWE problem.
All the protocols in this paper can be generalized to Zq and proven secure under the hardness of
the subset LWE assumption (and hence the standard LWE assumption). This requires us to sample
all the elements from Zq (instead of Z2), replace Berτ with Gauq,τ and perform all the operations
involved modulo q. We need also to specify how to replace the verification steps involving the
computation of Hamming weights wt(·). Given a vector e ∈ Znq sampled from Gaunq,τ (where
e has the form z − RT · s↓v mod q for an honest execution of the protocol from Section 3 or
z−RT ·s(v) mod q for the schemes from Section 4), this can be done by checking that the (squared)
Euclidean norm of e, i.e., the quantity ‖e‖2 := ∑ni=1|e[i]|2, does not exceed n ⌊ q2⌋ · τ ′ (which will
happen with overwhelming probability by the standard tail bound on Gaussians).
The change of domain from Z2 to Zq buys us security based on a different assumption, which is
known to be equivalent (for a proper choice of parameters) to the hardness of well-studied (worst-
case) lattice problems. This comes at the price of a higher computational complexity, which may
be a problem in the context of resource bounded devices.
B A Technical Lemma
Lemma B.1. For n, d ∈ Z, let ∆(n, d) denote the probability that a random matrix in Z(n+d)×n2
has rank less than n, then
∆(n, d) ≤ 2−d .
Proof. Assume we sample the n columns of a matrix M ∈ Z(n+d)×n2 one by one. For i = 1, . . . , n





as ¬Ei happens iff the ith column (sampled uniformly from a space of size 2n+d) falls into the space
(of size 2i−1) spanned by the first i− 1 columns. We get further
∆(n, d) = Pr[¬En] =
n∑
i=1
Pr[¬Ei|Ei−1] =
n∑
i=1
2i−1−n−d ≤ 2−d.
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